Africa Starts at the Pyrenees: Humor, Laughter, and Financial Recession in a Spanish Enclave in Morocco by Campbell, B
Africa Starts at the Pyrenees: Humor, Laughter, and 
Financial Recession in a Spanish Enclave in Morocco 
Brian Campbell
Anthropological Quarterly, Volume 92, Number 1, Winter 2019, pp. 143-172
(Article)
Published by George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research
DOI:
For additional information about this article




Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 1, p.143–172, ISSN 0003-5491. © 2019 by the Institute for 
Ethnographic Research (IFER) a part of The George Washington University. All rights reserved.
ARTICLE
Africa Starts at the 
Pyrenees: Humor, Laughter, 
and Financial Recession in a 
Spanish Enclave in Morocco
 
Brian Campbell, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
ABSTRACT
Located on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, the Spanish enclave of 
Ceuta depends almost entirely on subsidies from Madrid. When the newly 
elected conservative government initiated a rigorous austerity regime in 
2011, Ceuta quickly became Spain’s “unemployment capital,” and my 
fieldnotes started overflowing with stories of disorientation as personal 
life-trajectories collapsed and national narratives developed over four de-
cades of modernization and Europeanization became untenable. However, 
my diaries also contain page upon page of informants telling jokes, sharing 
caricatures, and watching satirical videos mocking Spain’s political class-
es and, ultimately, themselves. Answering a call by Angelique Haugerud 
(2013b), this article asks what anthropology can learn from local jokers and 
tricksters. Following Karin Barber (2005) and Nicolas Argenti (2016), and 
reading Ceuta’s obscene humor as a form of textual practice warranting 
serious ethnographic investigation, I argue that tricksters, locally appreci-
ated as excellent social analysts, have anticipated anthropological efforts 
to encourage lay audiences to rethink “the economy,” often considered 
to be an abstract, natural force. Indeed, my informants’ humor not only 
locates the crisis in human relations, but it also describes “neoliberal” dis-
courses as an ideology used by the financial class to claim resources and 
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redistribute blame. This article, however, urges caution when dialoguing 
with tricksters. The burgeoning literature on humor in times of crisis has 
tended to focus on showing that laughter is not merely a weapon of the 
weak, but a liberating practice that turns trauma into creativity, maintains 
solidarity, mobilizes political resistance, and is therefore central to social 
change. But my Ceutan informants often forget that tricksters are rarely 
the heroes they think they are. Their lewd jokes create conflict between 
the enclave’s inhabitants, hindering effective political mobilization and re-
producing gender, ethnic, and racial stereotypes that raise methodological 
and ethical problems for anthropology. [Keywords: Europe, financial crisis, 
Bakhtin, caricature, Spain, Bergson, joking]
Why So Serious? 
“Who is the President of Spain?” asked José one cold winter evening dur-
ing class. His 20 students, shivering at their desks, stared at him blankly. 
Most of them were interinos, junior civil servants temporarily hired by the 
Spanish state or the local government of Ceuta, a Spanish town on the 
Mediterranean coast of Morocco. Not one of them was learning English in 
the expectation of having to use it in a real-life situation. In their early 30s, 
they rather hoped that an English-language certification would improve 
their dwindling chances of landing a lucrative, permanent position in the 
Ceutan public sector. They dreamed of leaving behind years of precarious 
ill-paid work in favor of a stable life in which they could afford a house and 
raise a family.
Eventually, Maria raised her hand. “The actual President of Spain,” she 
ventured shakily, in heavily-accented English, “is Mariano Rajoy.”1
“Good!” replied José. “However, you made a small mistake. Anyone?” 
Ramón, another interino, stood up, smiling wryly. José’s face lit up, urg-
ing him on. “Well, the actual President of Spain,” he paused for effect, “is 
not Mariano Rajoy but Angela Merkel!”2
The laughter that consumed the group lasted many minutes before giv-
ing way to more jokes. Smartphones displaying political (and mostly ob-
scene) caricatures made their way across the room. Somebody shouted 
something about how surprised Merkel would be if she learned that in 
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this forgotten corner of Spain, the school of languages taught German. 
“Jorge for Headmaster! ‘Deutsche mentalität’ for all!” someone shouted 
back. The class roared its approval: the obscure German department only 
had a handful of students and ran at a loss. But one of its teachers, Jorge, 
had lived in Germany for many years, and missed no opportunity to stress 
the superiority of the “German mentality” of efficiency, self-sacrifice, and 
responsibility over the pitiful “Spanish” one of “anything-goes” (todo vale). 
The “lesson” ended soon after, but the group poured out of the school 
and into the closest tapas bar, where merry-making could proceed un-
hindered by schedules and aided by alcohol. On their way, they stumbled 
into none other than Jorge himself. The poor man was quickly overpow-
ered and dragged to the bar, where he was crowned as the new boss and 
brought countless liqueur shots as tribute. Some days later over coffee, 
Jorge admitted he did not enjoy the evening very much; he was unsure 
whether the students were laughing with or at him. Likewise, Miguel, an 
unemployed graduate, disapproved of Jorge’s rough treatment. “They 
have time for stupid jokes (tonterías) because they’re interinos. In exams 
for permanent recruitment into the public sector (oposiciones), they can 
claim job experience, which is more valuable than language qualifica-
tions.” Miguel stopped attending classes, feeling he could make better 
progress on his own.   
This was not an isolated event. Throughout 2011 and 2012, I watched 
the enclave descend into financial recession. My fieldnotes overflow with 
stories of widespread unemployment as well as disillusionment and dis-
orientation as personal life-trajectories collapsed and national narratives 
developed over decades of Europeanization became untenable. Yet my 
diaries also contain page upon page of informants telling jokes, sharing 
caricatures, and watching satirical videos mocking those they held re-
sponsible for Spain’s tragic downfall.
This article contributes to the study of how southern European societ-
ies are responding to the recession and the ensuing politics of austerity 
and structural adjustment. Here, anthropology has sought to understand 
emerging social movements (e.g., Panourgiá 2008, Dalakoglou and Vradis 
2011, Narotzky 2011, Gray 2016) and critique their discourse of “indig-
nation” (e.g., Narotzky 2016; Dalakoglou 2012; Theodossopolous 2013, 
2014a). Inspired by Scott (1987) and Abu Lughod (1990), scholars have 
also identified subtler techniques of resistance and coping in times of 
crisis. The Greeks, for example, deploy the symbolism of “hunger” and 
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“bread” to link the current recession to past crises, thus fostering the hope 
that they will thrive and survive just as they had previously (Knight 2012). 
In the meantime, they experiment with alternative credit or banking sys-
tems (Streinzer 2016), and household readjustments (e.g., Vournelis 2013, 
Knight and Stewart 2016). Citizens, moreover, strategize to satisfy their 
own need—and capitalize upon others’ desire—to maintain consumption-
based statuses (Pipyrou 2014, Knight 2015a). This literature has encour-
aged us to rethink the crisis as a space of opportunity and creativity, where 
our informants might prosper and where anthropologists can revisit basic 
ethical and methodological issues (Theodossopolous 2014a).
Recently, anthropology has discovered that humor is central to these 
techniques of coping and resistance. Jokes, caricatures, and humorous 
slogans have been identified as methods for expressing public discon-
tent in times of estrangement from the political process (Knight 2015b), as 
ways of preventing the contradictions of recession (e.g., saving citizens 
through austerity) from normalizing themselves (Kuipers 2011, Haugerud 
2013a), and as techniques offering moral superiority over the politically 
and economically mighty (Kalantzis 2015). However, ethnographers have 
been keen to demonstrate that laughter is more than just “a weapon 
of the weak.” Rather, it is crucial to political movements seeking social 
change. Witty slogans mobilize citizens, shift political debate, and mark 
political targets (Molé 2013b). The indignados of Madrid joke to ease ten-
sions amongst members and make boring administrative chores such as 
minute-taking tolerable (Fraile 2013). Humor can make or break political 
careers (Clybor 2013, Molé 2013a, Sheftel 2013), and clown-politicians 
have destabilized systems dominated by established, though increasingly 
distant, parties (Boyer 2013a, 2013b). 
Nicolas Argenti’s recent comparison between Cameroonian mourning 
rituals and carnival on the Greek island of Chios further develops this rela-
tionship between laughter, power, and crisis. Argenti rejects the assump-
tion that against the horrors of trauma and crisis, our informants can only 
stay silent and wait for “therapeutic intervention by western specialists” 
(2016:245). Following Bakhtin (1984), he instead shows that societies can 
appropriate the experiences of trauma and weave them into what Karin 
Barber (2005:266) would call “texts,” or “configurations of signs coher-
ently interpretable by a community of users” that, being detached and 
abstracted from daily discourse, can be reproduced and diffused. Indeed, 
in both Cameroon and Greece, the perpetrators (demons, spirits, pirates, 
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politicians) and memories of trauma (death of a king, pirate raids, reces-
sion) become “entextualized” (Barber 2007:22) in masks, caricatures, and 
carnival floats. In doing so, these terrifying forces are “degraded” into ob-
jects of caricature and ridicule that can be (mis)handled and destroyed by 
the laughter of communities they festively bring together (Argenti 2016). 
This article tests this model of a liberating, regenerative laughter against 
the Ceutan case. 
Argenti’s remark about “Western specialists” encourages us to addi-
tionally consider what the analysis of humor implies for anthropologists 
active in movements protesting austerity and “neoliberal” structural-ad-
justment programs. Over the past decade, animated debate has raged 
over the nature of “neoliberalism” and the term’s suitability as a category 
of ethnographic analysis. A number of anthropologists have argued that 
the concept has become an obstacle to the understanding of contem-
porary society. Imbued as it is with an uncontrollable baggage of con-
fused meanings,3 its use raises more questions than it answers (Ganti 
2014, d’Albergo 2016). Furthermore, scholars are too readily ascribing 
to “neoliberalism” phenomena that could be explained differently (e.g., 
Kipnis 2008, Collier 2012, Eriksen et al. 2015), making “neoliberalism” a 
hindrance to the full exploration of local categories, and thus fundamen-
tally anti-ethnographic.   
This position has been overshadowed by those who, while admitting 
that definitions do need sharpening, insist upon the existence of socio-
cultural processes that can be empirically distinguished as “neoliberal” 
(Ong 2006, Freeman 2007). These processes involve the use of state insti-
tutions to create free markets and manage the popular dissent that ensues 
through punitive technologies and auditing practices. This is legitimized 
through a discourse of “individual-rationality/responsibility” blaming citi-
zens for crime, unemployment, and failure (Kalb 2012, Wacquant 2012). 
“Neoliberalism” operates globally, they argue, and not pointing it out, es-
pecially when our informants fail to do so, would be anthropologically in-
correct and immoral (Eriksen et al. 2015). 
For many anthropologists working in southern Europe, the neoliberal 
cake not only exists, but must be eaten too. Political economy, particularly 
that inspired by Karl Polanyi (2001), has long sought to expose the his-
torical processes by which the idea of a “market” inhabited by “rational,” 
“maximizing” agents, comes to appear as natural and, therefore, universal 
(e.g., Buğra and Agartan 2007, Hann and Hart 2009, Graeber 2012, Hart 
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2012, Jessop 2013). While one need not define the post-2008 era as a 
“bailout” for anthropology (Schwegler 2009), it is clear that anthropolo-
gists, much like Knight’s (2015a) Greek informants, have found the crisis 
to be a fertile place where alternative economic regimes can be imagined 
(e.g., Graeber 2013, Gudeman 2005, Narotzky and Besnier 2014), forgot-
ten theorists revived (Hart 2010, Latour and Lepinay 2009), and ethnogra-
phy reconsidered (Herzfeld 2011). 
Most importantly, the recession has given economic anthropology the 
impetus to address new—potentially politically active—audiences seeking 
explanations for the current economic predicament as well as alternative 
models for organizing Western economies (Hart and Ortiz 2008, Haugerud 
2013b). Thus, Gillian Tett (2012) has argued that the US crisis could have 
been easily averted if politicians and economists had bothered asking an-
thropological questions about power and knowledge. Likewise, Gudeman 
(2016) urges a return to older anthropological models that see society as 
composed of “economic spheres of exchange,” with the household be-
ing the most important one. A “peopled economy,” he argues, reverses 
the “neoliberal” tendency for governments to exploit the “household” to 
prop up the failing, abstract sphere of high-finance. The values of house-
hold economies (“sustainability,” “thrift,” and “careful governance”) could 
also provide guidelines for a fairer financial sphere (Gudeman 2016). Wider 
in scope is Hart, Cattani, and Laville’s The Human Economy (2010). The 
book invites readers to participate in a number of practices—from infor-
mal economies, to fair trade, to solidarity networks, to microcredit—that 
promote an economy that is human (i.e., reducible to human action) and 
humane (i.e., the economy ought to serve society not vice-versa). This 
“human economy” euthanizes the “homo economicus,” “that mutilated 
soul” with “nothing human in his heart” (Latour and Lepinay 2009:25), and 
resuscitates a complete human agent whose economic behavior is moti-
vated by a dazzling range of personal desires, loyalties, and obligations. 
Many other authors have called for a similar awakening (e.g., Mirowski 
2014; Quiggin 2010; Kiersey 2011; Narotzky 2012, 2013). 
Following Barber (2005), and reading Ceutan humor as a form of tex-
tual practice that demands full anthropological attention, I suggest that 
Ceutans might have anticipated this scholarly critique of “neoliberalism.” 
They seem unimpressed by discourses of “maximizing individuals” and 
“self-regulating markets,” which they consider to be excuses that the 
powerful use to claim public resources and redistribute blame. Haugerud 
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(2013b) has recently asked economic anthropologists to learn from the 
tricksters of the societies they study. This article answers her call.
From the Depths of Africa to the Heights of Europe 
 “Africa starts at the Pyrenees,”4 lamented Carlos, an elderly post-master, 
one afternoon. “Youngsters like yourself do not understand what Spain has 
lost.” Repeating arguments that I commonly heard in the field, Carlos said 
that until the 1980s his country was “sad,” “dark,” “under developed,” and 
more akin to “beggar Africa” than Europe which received cheap, Spanish 
labor. 
Across the glittering straits of Gibraltar, my informants nonetheless 
agreed, Ceuta’s 80,000 or so Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Hindu inhab-
itants were doing considerably better. An important military base, Ceuta 
was also the preferred destination for young men doing their levy-duty 
(la mili). These troops and their families had to be housed, fed, and en-
tertained.5 They also frequently gave their civilian acquaintances prime-
quality army surplus—anything from watches to boots—which sold on 
the Spanish mainland (la Peninsula) for great profits. Ceuta’s strategically 
located Freeport was another source of employment and wealth. Those 
engaged in trading recall it in nostalgic terms: docks alive day and night, 
traders haggling over the endless stream of containers, sleep-deprived 
merchants selling ten containers a day, and funny misadventures with 
Moroccans, Russians, Chinese, and the strangest traders of them all: the 
paraguayos of the Peninsula.6 Ceutans uninterested in trading, the military, 
or the miniscule public sector had to leave. Many went to the mainland to 
work or study, but some travelled further to northern Europe. “I earned 
a lot of money,” Luis, a former waiter in the UK, once said, “but we were 
treated like shit. You know Fawlty Towers? We were Manuel.” The Ceutan 
believed foreigners saw him as decidedly inferior, barely human, let alone 
European. 
Everything changed, my informants insist, when General Franco died 
in 1975. Spain became a parliamentary democracy, joined the EU, and 
opened itself to European capital.7 In the 1990s, several Land Acts made 
vast expanses of land available for construction. The ensuing “economy 
of the brick,” with its insatiable need for labor, practically eliminated un-
employment and turned Spain into the prime destination for economic 
migrants (Jimenez Bautista 2012). Moreover, the availability of cheap 
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credit made home ownership not simply a real possibility, but a symbol of 
success in post-transition Spain.8 Economic achievements were followed 
with civic ones. During the 2000s, Spanish standards of living approached 
European averages, and in 2005, it became one of the first countries to 
legalize same-sex marriage in Europe, a moment of special importance to 
most of my informants. “I was proud to be Spanish,” José, from our intro-
ductory vignette, claimed, “In 1995, we were Europe’s laughing stock. In 
2005, we were its leaders!” 
 During this period, Ceuta’s economy also shifted radically, increasingly 
distancing itself from Morocco in favor of a quasi-complete dependence 
on Madrid. Compelled by the EU, the enclave fortified its border with 
Africa. Fierce competition from Morocco and Gibraltar did not help, and 
by the early 1990s, the golden age of “the bazaar economy” had come to 
an end. In 1995, however, much to the anger of the irredentist kingdom 
of Morocco, the enclave was granted the status of “Autonomous City” 
(Ciudad Autónoma). Symbolically, this confirmed Ceuta as an integral 
part of the nation-state, on par with the mainland. Practically, the enclave 
gained considerable self-governing powers,9 although matters central to 
national security remained in the hands of a governmental delegate ap-
pointed directly by Madrid.10 Ceuta’s new self-governing powers required 
the extension of its civil apparatus. Thanks to funds from Madrid,11 min-
istries were created, schools and hospitals multiplied, the police force 
strengthened, and an ever-increasing part of Ceuta’s inhabitants either 
form part of a wealthy class of professionals working for one of Ceuta’s 
many public institutions, or do their best to beat Moroccan cheap labor 
and participate in the informal12 or precariously delicate private13 indus-
tries that support civil servants.
The Spanish public sector is two-tiered. Every year, Spain’s regional 
governments recruit new individuals to either replace redundancies 
(namely, retired functionaries) or expand the civil service. Candidates for 
any public position—from teachers, to attorneys, to firemen—have to pass 
a series of public examinations (oposiciones). The competition is often 
brutal, and the written and oral examination notoriously difficult, randomly 
testing candidates’ knowledge on topics ranging from constitutional law 
to mathematics. Those who excel, however, can hope to become funcio-
narios: civil servants with unlimited tenure. In Ceuta, funcionarios receive 
bonuses to their already generous wage and pay little tax.14 Governmental 
offices often require additional manpower, but are unwilling or unable to 
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fund a funcionario position. Special oposiciones are thus held offering 
12-month placements (bolsas de trabajo). These interinos, as they are 
known, often greatly outnumber funcionarios, are not paid as well, and 
are transferred as needed. Moreover, since the renewal of their contract is 
not guaranteed, they find it impossible to get mortgages and hesitate from 
engaging in long-term commitments, such as marriage. Nonetheless, they 
accept these terms as the first step towards a permanent position and the 
resumption of their lives. 
Africa Starts at the Pyrenees, Again
“Enhorabuena!” We raised our glasses of beer, slammed them on the 
table, and downed them. Later, smoking outside, Nuria, an interino ac-
countant, correctly pointed out that I did not seem very enthusiastic about 
our mutual friend, Pablo, finding a job. Offering a history graduate €1,300 
for three months of full-time work in a supermarket did not warrant much 
celebration in my books, but Nuria simply shrugged. “We do live in a ‘puta 
crisis’ [fucking recession]” she said, matter-of-factly. 
The “puta crisis,” as my informants regularly called it, started in 2008, 
when the US housing industry collapsed, taking down with it Spain’s 
banking and commercial sector (Gavilan et al. 2011). Companies operat-
ing in Ceuta’s diminutive, tenuous private sector slashed wages, sacked 
employees, or closed down completely. During 2009 and 2010, as unem-
ployment rates kept rising, Ceutans working on the mainland lost their 
jobs and returned to their parents or close kin. 
Things became especially sour in November 2011, when the Christian-
Democratic Partido Popular (PP) won the national elections. Most of my 
informants, ardent PP supporters, hoped that the new government would 
breathe new life into the economy by clearing the webs of patronage and 
corruption associated with the previous social-democrat (PSOE) rulers. 
Instead, they watched in horror as, under tremendous pressure from 
Germany, President Mariano Rajoy initiated a policy of austerity aimed at 
reducing government expenditure. 
Ceuta needed that expenditure. All throughout winter, funcionario in-
terlocutors working in schools, hospitals, or governmental departments 
reported reductions in their budgets. Scholarships for undergraduate or 
postgraduate study became unavailable, and by February interinos and 
hopeful graduates learned that no oposiciones would be held that year. 
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Soon after, in the summer, funcionarios and interinos had their salaries re-
duced, their vacations limited, their workloads increased, and the symbol-
ically important “extra wages” removed.15 By July, interino interlocutors 
expressed uncertainty as to whether their contracts would be renewed, 
and indeed, some humanities teachers and junior nurses lost their jobs. 
Much to my informants’ shame, in December 2012, the enclave was de-
clared by El Pais Spain’s “unemployment capital,” with 39 percent of its 
residents jobless (El Pais 2013). 
Jobless and disoriented, for the institutions of patronage, hospitality, 
and humanitarian charity that developed during the 1990s and 2000s to 
keep Spain and Morocco “two worlds apart,” as local politicians regularly 
say, started crumbling away. Ceutan chests inflate with pride knowing that 
their government educates and shelters Moroccan children “abandoned” 
in Spanish territory.16 But in 2012, a humanitarian commission established 
that they were being housed in substandard conditions, and ordered the 
construction of a new expensive shelter the City could not afford. Many of 
my informants expressed anger at losing control over hospitality, but also 
expressed discomfort at the inability to pay for something as simple as 
decent accommodation for children. Similarly, doctors and nurses often 
reported visits from many Moroccans, and compassionately stated that 
their respect for human dignity prevents them from turning these souls 
away. Exhausted after 14-hour shifts, however, they also complained 
about shortages in resources needed “for Spaniards” while suggesting 
ways to stop the parasitic “Moro”17 from using or giving birth in Ceutan 
hospitals. These doctors were typically reprimanded by their colleagues, 
and, feeling ashamed, often had to withdraw their statements (e.g., El 
Mundo 2012b). Many Ceutan funcionarios likewise found it difficult to 
maintain their Moroccan maids, an informal relationship infused with the 
rhetoric of compassion (Campbell 2018). The enclave is furthermore the 
base for a number of NGOs that regularly send alimentary supplies to 
the poorest areas of Morocco. But when these same organizations an-
nounced that as of 2012 they would be collecting money for Spanish—
not “African”—children, Carlos, the elderly functionary, told me that “The 
NGO never changed its policy.” “Well, they used to donate to Africa, now 
to Europe,” I replied, taking the bait. “Ah, but they still do!”  he smiled bit-
terly. “Africa starts in the Pyrenees. Again.” 
Anti-austerity protest was limited in Ceuta. Public gatherings were reg-
ularly called by the localist/socialist party Caballas, but they were poorly 
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attended, and almost exclusively by hard-line Caballas supporters and 
interinos from the Peninsula. Indeed, Ceuta’s bonus-rich civil service is in-
credibly attractive to mainland Spaniards (de fuera),18 whose plan is often 
to endure a few years of enclave life and accumulate some money before 
seeking transfer to the mainland. But the recession made this impossible, 
and many found themselves stuck in the “Golden Cage” (jaula dorada), 
far from friends, parents, spouses, and children. They also reported de-
pression and loneliness in a small town of “parochial” (pueblo) inhabitants 
who frustratingly refuse to mobilize politically (pasotismo). Ceutan infor-
mants returned the animosity, questioning the wisdom of publicly pro-
testing against the party on which they depend for their livelihoods. They 
instead secured their interests by maneuvering in departmental politics. 
For example, Rocío, an interino teacher, following suggestions from her 
headmaster (with whom her father had cultivated a close friendship), took 
up English and started organizing extra-curricular activities for students. 
Julian, a nurse, mended breaches with his superior by offering to cover his 
shifts during holidays; while Bea, a drama teacher, decided to get married 
to hopefully deter the school from axing her. 
Unlike Knight’s Greek informants, Ceutans seemed unable to turn cri-
sis into opportunity. In informal interviews, they cited a long list of busi-
ness ideas that failed to take root in the enclave and refused to apply for 
the “funds for diversification and entrepreneurship” made available by a 
Ceutan government desperate to control unemployment. Large families 
subsisted as best as they could from governmental welfare. Like Anis, 
they made their €300 last by crossing to Morocco to buy cheap bread 
and vegetables. Like Anuar, they depended on parents, neighbors, and 
local Islamic NGOs for food and clothes; like Abdessalam, they reminded 
their children that dinner “was not a Muslim custom”; or like Mohamed, 
were reluctantly convinced to engage in small cross-border trading, a job 
traditionally associated with not only Moroccans, but Moroccan women. 
The wealthier unemployed, bored at home, attended academic cours-
es, probed well-placed friends for job opportunities, and, impeccably 
dressed, toured the town distributing CVs to whoever would take them. 
All unemployed residents, above all, hoped their name would come up in 
the Plan de Empleo,19 and, like Pedro, celebrated when offered temporary, 
ill-paid contracts with the private sector.  
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When Ceutans Laughed
Ethnographers have documented how, in an apparently illogical fashion, 
the recession-struck citizens of southern Europe still spend money on 
items that maintain their social status and practices they deem impor-
tant for a good, dignified life. The Greeks still go on their holidays (Knight 
2015a), the Italians still keep up their “bella figura” (Pipyrou 2014), and 
the Ceutans insist that life is for “living” (vivir) not “surviving” (sobrevivir). 
Bea, Rocío, and other unemployed women still go to their hairdressers, 
nail salons, and boutiques. Interinos, funcionarios, and most unemployed 
professionals still go on holiday (sometimes three to four times a year), 
and send their kids to all sorts of evening classes (like horse-riding). The 
Moroccan maid is a burden, but still indispensable. Good Internet, smart-
phones, and gym subscriptions are “expensive, but we got to live. And 
you meet people who might know of work,” as Pablo insists. But most 
importantly, “vivir” means keeping a public appearance, and this involved 
joining friends and colleagues for breakfast, lunch, tapas, and drinks in 
the city’s raucous cafés and jam-packed bars. Here, they scoured na-
tional, local, and work politics for clues as to what the uncertain future 
might hold while making fun of those they considered responsible for their 
predicament. 
Much of this joking, initiated by men, involved the sharing—through mo-
bile phones—of comics (tiras), gif-images, and satirical videos that often 
contained sexually charged themes (guarradas). Images were addition-
ally shared through social media platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, 
and Twitter, and, as the introductory vignette implies, sometimes had the 
power to invade the seriousness of the workplace. The vast majority of 
this material could be traced back to professional caricaturists or comedi-
ans working for the country’s top satirical magazines (such as El Jueves) 
or TV programs (such as El Intermedio). Sometimes, they were the work 
of experienced Ceutan or Andalusian carnival performers. My informants 
appreciated these tricksters (son buenos) for their skill at identifying and 
communicating phenomena that seem paradoxical, illogical, “crazy” (lo-
curas) even.    
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The President’s New Clothes 
I entered the school’s canteen to find the barman and some ten students 
(mostly interinos) huddled around a funcionario teacher known for his wit-
ty double-entendre humor, and laughing at something he was showing 
them on his expensive smartphone. I elbowed my way into the circle to 
confront a caricature depicting Angela Merkel, clad in nothing but black 
high-heeled shoes and ultra-tight latex underpants. Brandishing a red-hot 
poker (with a Euro at its head) in one hand and a whip in the other, she 
planted one heeled foot into the small of Rajoy’s back, who knelt submis-
sively at her feet, completely naked except for a black collar around his 
neck. “Brand or whip?” she sternly asked the sweating Rajoy, as the cap-
tion screamed, in bold red lettering, “The start of a beautiful friendship!” A 
marketing undergraduate student butted in with a similar tira: in this one, 
Merkel did not even bother asking, she had already chosen the whip and 
was mercilessly thrashing Rajoy’s buttocks. “I love punishing Spaniards!” 
she laughed hysterically. The teacher again, with another tira: Rajoy is 
in Merkel’s office. “I love Germany,” he says, innocently. “Good,” Merkel 
replies, “Take a seat!” But there is no chair in sight, and Rajoy can only sit 
on a German Wold War I helmet, whose steel spike glistens threateningly. 
“German love,” the caption reads, “comes from deep within.” Someone 
was about to present another caricature, but the bell dispersed us guffaw-
ing to class. 
The recurrent theme in Ceutan humor was the sexualization of the polit-
ically unequal relationship between Rajoy and Merkel. Countless tiras de-
picted Merkel as coldly and sadistically masculine, while the whimpering 
Rajoy, passively effeminite, became her oddly willing partner. Thus, one 
morning, a group of interino nurses had a giggle over a tira in which Merkel 
congratulates Rajoy on his electoral victory and expresses her desire to 
work with him. Rajoy, sweating uncontrollably, looks at the obscenely large 
strap-on dildo attached to her ample waist. Another evening, I was having 
a drink with a group of undergraduate students, whose discussion about 
the inadequacies of Rajoy’s regime gave way to jokes where a young med-
ical student showed a video parody of Psy’s 2012 hit “Gangnam Style.”20 
Rajoy shows up as an arrogant bully, but turns submissive when he runs 
into Merkel, for whom he pulls his pants down to reveal his gold-and-red 
underwear. Some comics sexualized and infantilized Rajoy. Pictures that 
photo-manipulate Rajoy into a pouting baby lying in Merkel’s arms and 
staring longingly at her breasts were easy to come across. “If you don’t 
Africa Starts at the Pyrenees: Humor, Laughter, and Financial Recession  
in a Spanish Enclave in Morocco
156
do as you’re told, you won’t get any treats,” she admonished gently in 
one tira. Another caricature draws Rajoy as a carpet, screaming in pain as 
Merkel wipes her shoes on him. “Welcome home!” the caption reads. A 
common trope was to portray Rajoy as a puppet, lying lifelessly in Merkel’s 
lap, worn in her hand, or dancing as she operates the strings. An impres-
sive photo-manipulation shared by a satirical Facebook page parodies 
blockbuster movie posters. Rajoy, dressed as a 1950s mafia boss, walks 
towards the reader looking hilariously determined. In the background, the 
Moncloa flies a red flag charged with a white circle charged with a black 
Euro sign. “Public Enemy” screams the title, “A movie by Angela Merkel.”
While most tiras, as the above examples indicate, depicted Rajoy as 
an unequivocal loon, comic strips dealing with his management of the 
austerity regime represented him as a cunning sadist, who enjoys inflict-
ing pain and tricking Spaniards into voting for him. In one tira, sent by 
some funcionarios trying to explain the recession to me, Rajoy repeats a 
quote from a press-conference: “The age of petty cuts is now over,” he 
says as he drops a small pair of scissors and brandishes an enormous 
chainsaw. Indeed, caricatures depicting Rajoy as Edward Scissorhands 
are common. “We’re done with austerity,” Rajoy claims in another comic. 
However, the President is clearly lying, for his nose, like Pinocchio’s, is ex-
panding rapidly, and pierces right through the heart of a worker standing 
by. A tira a university teacher shared with his colleagues as they discussed 
the recession shows Rajoy holding a bloody dagger. In front of him, a man 
and a woman are tied down to a red altar decorated with skulls and Euro-
symbols. They seem petrified. “Don’t look at me that way,” Rajoy mut-
ters, his face expressionless, “I told you some sacrifices had to be made!” 
Overlooking the grim scene is a golden statue of a fat, six-armed man, 
posing in the style of Shiva, the Lord of Dance. He is dressed in a suit and 
a top-hat, has a cigar in his evil smile, and a money bag in each hand, and 
engraved on his wide torso is the word Bankia.21
“Not Enough Bread for all this Chorizo” 
I introduced Laura to a group of acquaintances having breakfast in a cafe 
one February morning. Sitting down in chairs made available to us, we 
tried to tune into the existing conversation. Jesus, an unemployed history 
teacher, was dramatically describing how his sister had applied for a le-
gal consultancy position in a Catalonian town. She was shortlisted for an 
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interview, but failed to get the job because the director preferred another 
candidate who could speak Catalan. Jesus’s audience was outraged by the 
Catalan director’s behavior, and soon started making fun of Catalans and 
their secessionist efforts. One started parodying their language, speaking 
some Italian-sounding gibberish, while another implied their unimagina-
tive nation-building ripped off Cuba’s revolutionary discourse and flag. 
Someone brandished a tira depicting Arturo Mas22 as a bearded Moses 
who got lost leading his people to their promised land. Jesus replied with 
a YouTube clip where Mas, dressed as Braveheart’s William Wallace, rides 
up to an army of Catalonians armed with spears.23 The Catalan soldiers in 
the clip shout that it is high-time Catalonia became its own nation-state, 
free from the EU, and sporting its own football league. Mas tries to ex-
plain that independence might look somewhat different, and the confused 
troops drop their weapons and go home. Everyone laughed as to how 
stupid and misguided Catalonians are. Eventually, Africa, an IT technician, 
took interest in my friend Laura: 
“New to Ceuta?” Africa asked.
“Yes, I work at the port,” Laura replied. 
“And where are you from?”
“Barcelona.”   
There was a moment of awkward silence, until Jesus decided that since 
the damage had already been done, there was no point holding back. It 
is “unfair” that Catalonia uses its bilingualism to exclude Castilians while 
they are free to work wherever they want, he argued. Others testified to 
Catalan snobbery, and one embarked on an epic tale of how Catalans 
refused to help him while on holiday because they claimed they didn’t 
speak castellano.  Laura said nothing, but afterwards warned me never to 
introduce her to “people of the presidio”24 again. Her fatal first encounter 
with Ceutans, an episode she never restrained from retelling, reinforced 
her already low opinions of the enclave’s inhabitants. 
Humor could, therefore, have an unexpectedly divisive effect. 
Occasionally, it was explicitly used to wound. A Valencian physics teacher 
often teased one of her funcionario friends by sending her tiras mocking 
Rajoy’s attempts at keeping the country together. In one such comic, Rajoy 
poses in Catalan costume. “I’ll become pro-independence,” he claims, 
smugly, “I’m so incompetent that if I join, the movement will surely fail.” 
When Mas’s movement floundered in late 2012, the Ceutan bought a copy 
of El Jueves and thrust it—in public—into her friend’s face. The magazine’s 
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front cover depicted Rajoy jubilantly reproducing the Catalonian indepen-
dence flag, La Estelada, by bending over and exposing his anus while 
holding the traditional striped flag of Catalonia below his buttocks. “Here’s 
your starry banner!” he shouts triumphantly at the vanquished Mas. The 
Valencian took it very badly. The two spent several months avoiding each 
other, and when I was sent to mend the breach, the Valencian said she had 
had enough of “these villagers. They can’t take a joke! She embarrassed 
me in front of my students! It was the last straw!”
Privately interviewed, almost everyone complained about how not only 
Rajoy but the entirety of the Spanish political class, including the mon-
archy and the banks, were solely interested in preserving the status quo 
and their access to Spanish wealth. The PSOE25 and PP might present 
themselves as mortal opponents, I was often told, but that’s just a “set up” 
(montaje). Ultimately, they are “all friends,” “a sect,” “a free-masonry,” or, 
most commonly, “chorizos,” Spanish slang for “thieves.” Many repeated 
the pun sloganized by Madrid’s indignados: “We don’t have enough bread 
for all this chorizo.” There were too many thieves, and too little left to steal. 
 These fury-evoking (indignantes) spectacles, as Jesus pointed out, “are 
so incredible, you can barely tell fact from fiction, joke from reality.” He re-
called one case where the PP politician Andrea Fabra was filmed shouting 
“Fuck them!” as new austerity measures were announced. “You’d almost 
think she’s just revealing party policy,” Jesus joked. Other cited episodes 
included the use of public funds to hire clowns for a birthday party, the 
Majorcan Tourism Minister posing with a pair of bleeding deer testicles on 
his head, and the monarchy’s involvement in a money laundering case that 
forced the King to persuade the court to release Princess Cristina, wife 
of the scandal’s perpetrator (El Mundo 2012a). A tira shared by a number 
of my informants thus depicted the King, naked, sitting in a gold-gilded 
bed. His left arm is wrapped around a blindfolded woman lying by his 
side. Evidently dazed, she is unable to hold onto her sword and scales. 
“Corinna26 is now a thing of the past,” the caption reads “The King now 
screws Justice.” 
In public, joking becomes politically consequential. In one instance, 
one newspaper editor sought a “cheeky” journalist willing to openly ridi-
cule the PP. “The government only funds you if you’re dangerous,” he 
commented solemnly. But that was an exceptional case: generally speak-
ing, people watch their tongue around high-level funcionarios known to be 
PP supporters (thought capable of influencing oposiciones, promotions, 
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or welfare distribution). Thus, one afternoon over coffee, I was discussing 
with Marco, a clerk, the King’s infamous 2010 Botswana hunting accident, 
when the royal jeep was ambushed by an elephant that broke the King’s 
hip, costing Spaniards tens of thousands of Euros. This commentary was 
tailed by sharing a number of tiras involving the king’s relationships with 
elephants, but climaxed with a famous El Jueves tira—originally banned—
whose caption read: “Elections are coming: 2,500 euro for every kid!” The 
then still Prince of Spain, Felipe was drawn naked, having sex with his 
wife Letizia. “Getting you pregnant,” he exclaims, “would be the closest 
to real work I’ve done my entire life!” Carlos, however, told me to shut up 
as a mutual friend of ours, a high-ranking civil servant and the son of an 
army lieutenant, approached to greet us. “Monarchist,” Carlos explained 
later, “they’ve no humor and good connections, I hear he personally drove 
some people into retirement. Not sure I want to test that theory.”  
Similarly, one afternoon over lunch, some interino teachers were watch-
ing a clip of a Cadiz carnival performance mocking Bibiana Aido, the un-
der-achieving daughter of a high-ranking PSOE politician who, in 2008, 
had been given the reins of the brand new Ministry of Equality. The irony 
was not lost on most of the group, but two female interinos, self-declared 
socialists, did not find it funny. Unlike the “PP’s church-loving fascists 
[fachas],” Aido’s ministry had done much for minority rights in Spain, they 
protested. In any case she was no worse than Fátima Báñez, PP’s Minister 
of Employment. “If she managed to land a job,” one laughed nervously, 
“then we must be really coming out of the crisis.’” 
The Mirror
 Luis laughed out loud as he finished reading an article about Juan Vivas’s27 
declaration of support, in these hard times, for an undivided Spain led 
by the monarchy. “In the Peninsula,” he told his colleagues, “you have 
Catalans and Basques saying ‘No! We’re not Spanish!’ and Madrid tells 
them, ‘Yes, you are! You can’t leave!’ Ceutans are the only ones who want 
to be Spanish. ‘Look! We’re good Spaniards!’, we say. But Madrid replies, 
‘No, you’re Moros.’” 
Indeed, my informants had a taste for gallows humor in which they 
were the butt of their own jokes. For example, one caricature depicts a 
desperate woman standing on her balcony. A ghostly hand—the words 
Bank, Government on its wrist—is about to nudge her off the edge. A local 
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comic shows some Guardia Civil guarding the border with Morocco. “You 
sure you want this?” they ask the Sub-Saharans climbing over the wall 
into Spain. Another tira features a group of hopeful men approach a pros-
titute. “No, I don’t do group discounts,” she tells the disappointed group. 
Similarly, in a professional caricature, Jesus has been nailed to a cross, 
but only by his feet, so he has fallen forward, face-planting into the stony 
ground. “Sorry, we’re out of nails,” a Roman soldier apologizes. “Puta 
crisis,” a frustrated Christ replies. And finally, when one evening some 
university students were discussing the mounting rate of suicides, a nurs-
ing student reiterated an El Jueves joke: “Come on,” he said, “It’s not like 
Rajoy can change the law of gravity. Besides, suicides are the only thing 
keeping unemployment in check at the moment.” Most laughed nervously, 
but some found it offensive, I later learned. 
Some material ridiculed Spaniards for failing to see the crash coming. 
A famous animation by Aleix Saló28 describes Spain as a country that has 
just woken up with a massive hang-over and must be reminded what hap-
pened during the drunken 1990s and 2000s. It all started, Saló claims, when 
“the God of Neo-Liberalism” (el dios Yuppie), represented as a cool-look-
ing bearded man with sunglasses and a Euro-halo, appeared to President 
Aznar in 1998 and gave him two stone slabs bearing the new “Land and 
Labor Laws.” Over the ensuing prosperous decade under Aznar’s leader-
ship (he now wears ragged robes and wields, like Moses, a staff in one 
hand and the stone slabs in the other), Spain spent so much cheap credit 
it really thought it was rich. But the “Spanish Dream,” Saló says, was an 
illusion conjured by financial speculation: modern “España” (symbolized 
by the Osborne Bull) was, all along, the third-world “Españistan” (drawn 
as a skinny, dying cow). 
Grotesquely Mechanical Texts
A systematic analysis of Ceuta’s humor allows us to sharpen anthropo-
logical understandings of laughter’s relation to crisis, while addressing 
the role academics can/should play in European protest movements. If 
we accept Ceuta’s caricatures and jokes to be a type of “text” as de-
fined by Barber—abstractions from the flows of daily discourse that can 
be reproduced and diffused (2005)—then analysis can proceed along the 
guidelines she recommends anthropologists follow when studying these 
cultural products. Texts, Barber argues, seem to invite close scrutiny and 
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dialogue. We should surrender to this allure, bringing our interpretative 
apparatus to bear on a key way societies think about and represent them-
selves (Barber 2007:1–14). Secondly, anthropologists must pay attention 
to “entextualization” (2007:22), the process of creating text out of daily 
discourses. Who, then, makes texts, and why? Which genres29 do they be-
long to? Is “humor” a genre? Are there local traditions of “humor”? How do 
texts lose and adopt meaning as they enter new sociocultural contexts? 
Anthropology has generally approached humorous texts from a te-
leological perspective that goes back to Herbert Spencer and Sigmund 
Freud. Their “Relief Theory” viewed laughter (and joking) as the safe re-
lease of pent-up physiological or psychological stress (Morreal 1987, 
Freud 1976).30 Classical social anthropology transplanted this idea of 
stress relief to the social body. Political hierarchies, exploitative relation-
ships and obligations, household feuding, inter-factional struggle, exclu-
sive kinship roles: all generate tensions that threaten the reproduction of 
society’s structure. Hence the need for special institutions that mock and 
invert these stress-generating relationships and act as “taps” for the re-
lease of social pressure (Radcliffe-Brown 1940, Honigmann 1942, Charles 
1945). It is clear, however, that the hands of the established order are never 
far from the valves controlling this pressure (Welsford 1968, Sales 1983). 
DaMatta and Green (1983) therefore accuse humor of being “Janus-faced” 
because it ultimately reproduces the social-structure it contests. Eagleton 
(1981:148) similarly laments that “there is no slander in an allowed fool,” 
while Balandier (1970:40) concludes that humor is “power’s supreme ruse: 
to allow itself to be contested ritually in order to consolidate itself more 
effectively.” 
Preoccupation with the function of humor is still central to studies of 
satire in crisis-torn Europe, although, as we have observed, effort has been 
dedicated to show that humor can mobilize overt political action aiming to 
transform social-structure. Ceutas’s distinctive taste for obscene jocular-
ity, however, urges us to reflect on the form of humor (particularly its articu-
lation around specific tropes) as well as its function. “Relief theory” is not 
very helpful here, so we turn instead to Henri Bergson and Mikhail Bakhtin, 
who insist that the analysis of what humor does must be suspended until 
we consider what humor is. 
We laugh, Bergson (2005) argues, when the situations we find ourselves 
in, the characters we meet, the way they behave, appear “mechanical,” 
that is, driven by some internal, incontrollable, automatic momentum. The 
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humorous object is, therefore, unable to react to its social environment, 
which is always changing. This is the central kernel of genres such as sat-
ire, parody, or irony collectively identified as “funny.” Mismatches between 
“society” and the “mechanical object” can proceed from physical defects 
(misshapen limbs, stutters, uncontrollable bowels) or from flaws of char-
acter (absent-mindedness, vices, virtues, bad habits) that make individu-
als misjudge the world around them and oblige them to act in contextually 
inappropriate ways. Bergson (2005) concludes that laughter is indeed co-
ercive, but the object of mockery must be first identified (or produced) as 
too slow, too detached, too stupid, and/or too different to respond to the 
ever-changing needs of “society.”31  
Ceutan laughter is provoked by mechanical responses to the “puta cri-
sis,” a social environment characterized by radical change and uncertainty. 
The main contradiction, as noted, involved a political class of noblemen, 
cultists, gangsters, and chorizos oblivious to the grim realities lived by 
those who had entrusted them with saving the country. Tiras thus depict 
them as fools unable to govern their bodies or desires (let alone a country); 
or, alternatively, as cunning individuals selfishly using their administrative 
acumen. Equally ironic to my informants, are policies designed to pro-
tect a nation by redirecting resources to the financial class (held respon-
sible for the recession) at the request of Germany (assumed not to have 
Spanish interests at heart). Many were the mechanical flaws offered by the 
tiras to explain this contradiction: politicians were regularly imagined as 
cowards, prostitutes, sexual slaves, carpets, babies, and puppets, morally 
weak characters whose very nature is to bend, perhaps even voluntarily, 
to higher agencies. By extension, many tiras saw Spanish politicians as 
mystified by demands by the financial sector for more public money and 
the use of legal mechanisms to draw more and more national institutions 
(e.g., public land, labor, housing, health) into a free market dominated by 
the banks. This rhetoric, in fact, was often depicted as a false religion 
(e.g., Saló’s Yuppie God, El Jueves’s cultic Bankia) which—being false—
proceeds from human interests and turns the intellectually-challenged 
into misguided prophets. Some tiras, furthermore, located the crisis in 
Spanish national character: Spaniards thought they were European, but 
they lacked the moral fiber, the intellectual foresight, and the civic maturity 
to use the gains of the 1990s to prepare for darker times ahead. In short, 
the crisis struck Spain because it is Spain: a perfect mechanical trope. 
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While Bergson urges us to dwell on how humor and indignation are but 
different sides of the same coin that is social contradiction, Bakhtin offers 
insights into a similar relationship between laughter and horror. In Rabelais 
and His World, Bakhtin traces laughter’s history back to the middle and 
classical ages, where Europeans “lived in two worlds” (1984:7). On the 
one hand, is the “official world” of the established political order, along 
with the rituals and myths that performatively institutionalize this order as 
divinely ordained or, alternatively, natural and ahistorical. Mirroring this 
is “a second world outside officialdom in which all people participated” 
which offered a “completely different, non-official” explanation “of man 
and of human relations” (1984:7). This was achieved, Bakhtin argues, by 
taking all that projects itself as “high, spiritual, ideal, abstract, distant” 
and “degrading” it to the “material level, to the sphere of the earth and the 
body (1984:19–20).” And what a body! Power is confined in “grotesque,” 
out-of-shape vessels disgustingly unable to control their insatiable pri-
mary needs (i.e., to feed, to defecate, to procreate). Thus “mechanized,” 
to echo Bergson, the agents, symbols, and practices of power—no matter 
how abstract and terrifying—become objects of ridicule to be destroyed 
by ritual laughter. “No dogma, no authoritarianism, no narrow-minded se-
riousness, no pomposity, no ready-made solution” was safe “degrada-
tion” (Bakhtin 1984:3). Actually, the harder something tried to escape “the 
folk”—through censorship, perhaps, or with threat of hellfire—the sweeter 
its violation becomes.  
Bakhtin laments that modernity brought with it the triumph of “the 
official world,” and the confinement of degrading laughter to set times 
and spaces (such as carnival or textual genres like satire) (1984:59–144). 
Nonetheless, it is impossible not to recognize degradation at work in 
Ceutan humor. Public figures and abstract organizations (politicians, 
royalty, banks, nations, governments) are given repulsive and ridiculous 
bodies. Complex relations between these figures and organizations, are 
likewise reduced to terrifying, yet hilarious bodily interactions: politicians 
are locked in orgies (peer-like, though exclusive encounters) with banks; 
arcanely complex financial maneuvers become violent sexual encounters 
(where, clearly, someone is screwing someone else). Likewise, in the up-
side down world of recession where “aid” translates to painful austerity, 
the intimacy of sex becomes violent abuse. The list goes on—austerity is 
a weapon that kills; the limitations imposed by recession are explained 
in frustrated bodily functions (e.g., failed sexual encounters); Spain’s 
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embodiment as the proud Malboro Bull is discarded for a dying third-
world cow—although an interesting problem arises when grounding the 
unequal relationship between Germany and Spain. Evidently, satirists find 
this conflicts with Rajoy’s and Merkel’s actual genders. Their masculinity 
and femininity therefore become weirdly inverted and confused.  
Where does this leave us in relation to anthropological attempts to 
guide and inform protest movements? As Argenti (2016) has observed 
occurring on the island of Chios and in the kingdom of Oku, when faced 
with a storm that has collapsed life-trajectories and national narratives, 
stranded them in the enclave, or scattered them across Spanish territory, 
the inhabitants of Ceuta have explored responses other than just keeping 
calm and holding on for dear life. They weaved the experiences of trauma 
into creative texts that provide hilarious explanations to infuriating contra-
dictions and turn the horrifying agents of power into ridiculous objects that 
can be overcome by laughter. 
Moreover, scholars have noted that if specialists of comic “entextualiza-
tion” want their work to resonate, they must be, first of all, excellent social 
observers and critics (e.g., Douglas 1975, Billig 2005, Sciama 2016). And, 
on this level, their observations seem similar to those of anthropology. 
Satire exposes the “economy” as a “human” and “peopled” one, reducible 
to political interactions between identifiable human agents, the more pow-
erful of which are branded responsible for the crash. The tiras described 
in this article have no problem parodying the discourses of “neoliberal-
ism” (free markets, structural adjustments, individual rationality-respon-
sibility-discipline) as an ideology that claims to be at once arcane and 
natural, but is in fact used by a small group attempting to suck Spanish 
resources. Spanish satire suggests that those who follow these principles 
become pitifully grotesque caricatures not too dissimilar to Tarde’s homo 
economicus. Hopelessly out of tune with the world, they are dangerous 
not only because they mechanically hack limbs and push Spaniards off 
(literal and metaphorical) balconies, but because they seem unable to stop 
from insisting that the fault for the recession lies squarely with the average, 
financially incompetent Spaniard (e.g., El Pais 2009, Libertad Digital 2009). 
Furthermore, although the majority of the satire cited ridicules “neolib-
eralism,” it does not consider it as the major bogey. In a nod to Polanyi 
(2001), they instead reflect on the role that the Spanish political class—the 
nation’s elected champions—ought to play in governing, not exorcizing, 
demands from the EU or the banking sector. The overarching concern is 
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that the government either offers only pathetic resistance to capital, or has 
altogether discarded its role as the manager of the “double movement,” 
throwing its lot behind these hostile interests.  
At this point, to follow Barber—and therefore shift our attention to 1) 
the specialists of entextualization themselves (often invisible or silent in 
ethnographic texts) (2007:103–136), and 2) the traditions and tropes of 
satire as a local genre (2007:32–66)—is to part ways with Argenti and other 
scholars of humor. In effect, three issues arise that advise caution when 
dealing with tricksters. 
First, the texts that my informants seemed so fond of exhibited many 
characteristics typical of a long and venerable tradition of satirical produc-
tion in Spain, a tradition which, my informants agreed, finds its undisputed 
apex in the Andalusian carnival (Gilmore 1998, Gilmore and Gilmore 1979, 
Mitz 1997). Amongst the main traits of this tradition—its dominance by 
men, its wit and lyrical genius, its propensity for disaster (which we will 
shortly revisit)—is, of course, its reliance on obscenity as well as crude 
tropes of gender, class, ethnicity, and race. Indeed, while my informants’ 
joking demolished the symbolic order, it could not destroy all of it, and this 
is key. Actually, not only were many (hierarchical and coercive) dichoto-
mies and stereotypes left untouched, they actually had to be reproduced 
for humor to mount its assault on power. For example, Spanish elites were 
blamed for the country’s collapse, but in order to quantify the gravity of the 
situation, several tiras had to compare Spain with Africa, where Africa de-
noted an undesirable, uncivilized, backwards state of being. Similarly, the 
“degradation” of Rajoy’s governance of the banking sector rests on the as-
sumption that prostitutes are “low” beings who sell their dignity and integ-
rity. Tiras about Spanish–German relationships reproduce gender stereo-
types (where passive = female). Cultural essentializations of all types were 
the blocks on which most degradation was built. Bergson’s “mechanical 
objects” are just as questionable, for in order to establish, emphasize, and 
overcome the contradictions required for humor, artists had to sometimes 
translate political ineptness into physical and mental disability, or further 
solidify questionable national stereotypes. As Theodossopolous (2014a) 
outlines in regards to the discourses of the “infuriated,” humor can exhibit 
deconstructive abilities that need to be taken seriously. However, it can 
(and sometimes must) be simultaneously simplistic and essentialist, re-
producing racist, xenophobic, masochistic ideas that present writing chal-
lenges for the ethnographer and make anthropologists think twice before 
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rallying behind (or leading, even) these movements (Theodossopolous 
2014b).   
Further analysis of the Ceutan case leads us to question the integrative, 
liberating power of humor. Certainly in Ceuta, while humor ridiculed elites 
and their ideologies, it was also effective at sparking conflict amongst 
“the people.” Jokes confirmed, reproduced, and amplified animosities 
between Ceutans and “de fuera,” Castilians and Catalans, “funcionarios” 
and “interinos,” public servants and private employees, PP supporters 
and PSOE activists, monarchists and republicans, employed and unem-
ployed, etc. These collective identities, along with discourses seeking to 
(de)legitimize a groups’ claim to local resources, though pronounced in 
times of recession, have been present in Ceutan society since the shifts 
that made it almost totally dependent on public expenditure. These an-
tagonisms, at once born of Ceuta’s singular economy, have done nothing 
to facilitate effective political mobilization to resist austerity and/or change 
the enclave’s economic model.   
Of course, if Ceuta’s existing social tension is the powder keg, the pro-
vocative nature of Spanish traditions of humor supplies a most ardent 
flame. Scholars have repeatedly noted how Spanish satirists, heavily cen-
sored and suppressed during long decades of dictatorship, have learned 
to skillfully use their lyrical and artistic genius to metaphorically encrypt 
their assaults on politicians or peers (Schrauf 1998, Gonzalez Troyano et. 
al. 1983). These cryptic messages leave targets with two equally unap-
pealing options. One can keep calm, carry on, and hope that either no 
one gets the reference or that the joker meant no lasting harm. But this 
might be interpreted as cowardice in a small town such as Ceuta, where 
reputation is so important, yet so easily ruined. So, it seems safer to take 
exception to ridicule. The ensuing rift can spiral out of control. Just to 
give one dramatic example, in 2006, one Muslim politician sued some 
carnival performers for lyrics he found to be racist and xenophobic. The 
six-year feud that followed undermined the authority of the law-courts 
and Ceuta’s conflict-resolution abilities, and climaxed in a large protest 
by the enclave’s Muslim population that saw shops vandalized and two 
elderly Christians hospitalized (Campbell 2014). The same uncomfortable 
ambiguity of humor, however, is something we have seen operating on a 
smaller, more personal level in the vignettes discussed in this article. 
Thirdly, while the recession does inspire satirists, we can hardly claim 
that the caricaturists of El Jueves, or the semi-professional performers 
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of the carnival, or the satirical presenters of El Hormiguero, are reduc-
ible to the crisis. It is easy to forget that tricksters, much like the genres 
they belong to, have predated and will likely outlive the recession. They 
have careers, and mock for a living. Of course they use their genius to 
swipe at banks and politicians! How could one overlook such easy tar-
gets? But ultimately they make fun of everyone: royals, politicians, bank-
ers, the left, the right, clergymen, atheists, and even their own audiences. 
Additionally, their major breakthroughs take place when the ambiguity of 
their art creates drama. El Jueves’s most famous caricature remains the 
one that got banned, the carnivalistas’ feud saw them comfortably winning 
three consecutive competitions, and I could not but suspect that when 
my (less skilled) interlocutors reproduced jokes that got them in trouble, 
the real winner was neither the interino nor the politician, but the trickster 
many miles away whose critique could shape-shift in unpredictable ways 
to yield unexpected effects. One can never be sure if the joke was on the 
joker. 
So what can we learn from tricksters (Haugerud 2013b)? Clearly, jokes—
especially those written and told by professional comedians—might have 
agendas that challenge anthropological sensibilities. Nevertheless, their 
acute command of social, political, and cultural processes cannot be ig-
nored. In effect, as Fernandez and Taylor point out (2001), tricksters and 
anthropologists share a passion for irony, as well as phenoma that chal-
lenge our logic and understanding of the human condition. This, I find, 
constitutes ground for dialogue. Conversations with tricksters will help us 
ask fresh questions about the purpose and ethics of ethnography, which 
in turn can enhance our engagement with, and participation in, the world. 
Or, perhaps, the trickster is playing his tricks on us academics, as 
well. n 
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1At the time of writing, Mariano Rajoy was leader of the Spanish Christian-democrat “Partido Popular” 
and President of Spain. 
2Leader of the German “Democratic Union Party” and Chancellor of Germany.
3“Neoliberalism” could be a “sloppy” synonym for financial capitalism, or refer to a vague ideology of 
individualism and rationalism, or to policies of free markets, or to denote economic practices simply 
defined as “bad.”
4The phrase is commonly attributed to Alexandre Dumas, although he never published it in any of his 
works. It was widely used in the 19th and 20th centuries by Spaniards and non-Spaniards alike to refer to 
Spain’s increasing economic, political, and cultural insignificance in relation to Europe and the US.  
5Ceuta’s wealthiest businessmen, notably the Jewish Bentolila family, started out as army suppliers during 
the dictatorship.
6Literally, The Umbrella People, traders from mainland Spain who often visited, much to the bafflement of 
Ceutan traders, to buy monumental supplies of umbrellas. 
7In fact, Spain’s rapid economic development started in the final decade of Franco’s reign. 
8Even migrants were drawn into the idea that homeownership marked their integration into Spanish so-
ciety (Sabaté 2016).
9Some localist political parties remain unhappy with this agreement, and lobby for greater self-governing 
power.
10This includes trade, migration, and foreign affairs. 
11By 2012, Madrid shouldered not only the Delegate’s operations but also 60 percent of the City govern-
ment’s expenditure of around €300 million.
12Namely, construction and domestic work. 
13Such as supermarket or shop assistants. 
14Theoretically, these bonuses offset Ceuta’s exorbitant rents, though local Muslims insist these privileges 
are designed to attract peninsular Christians to counter Muslim’s high birth-rates. Private sector workers 
do not receive these bonuses. 
15“Las pagas extras,” introduced by Franco, are two additional salary installments paid in June and 
December to improve standards of living and move the economy through spending.
16In 2016, the Ceutan government was taking care of 814 children (up to 16 years old). 
17The Spanish derogatory term for Moroccan Muslims, who are thought to possess a malevolent cunning 
that drives them to parasitically prey on Spanish resources. 
18Literally, outsiders.
19A governmental welfare programme that offers a number of six month contracts to Ceuta’s unemployed, 
befitting their education level. Selection is random, although the general suspicion is patrons swing the 
odds in favor of their clients. 
20Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aOuxWamcSdE.
21A conglomeration of banks formed in 2010. In 2012, Bankia came close to the brink of collapse, and had 
to be semi-nationalized and bailed out (for a value of €20 billion) by the Spanish government. 
22President of the Generalitat of Catalonia between 2010 and 2015, and leader of the secessionist 
“Democratic Convergence of Catalonia.” 
23Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KHgX1QNGHX0.
24Literally, a prison-fort. 
25The PP’s main rivals, at the time led by Alfredo Rubalcaba.
26A German aristocrat with whom the King was suspected of having a long-time affair. 
27Ceuta’s Mayor-President.
28Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWrbAmtZuGc.
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29Loosely defined by Barber (2005) as sets of expectations and assumptions shared between author and 
audience that aids the interpretation of a text.
30Spencer thought laughter released stress in neck and chest muscles (Morreal 1987). Freud (1976) 
thought humor central to the “pleasure principle” that drives the id to seek immediate fulfilment and retreat 
from pain and suffering. Psychoanalysts would have a field-day with Ceutan gallows humor.
31We cannot laugh at things we feel sorry for, so the comedian’s art lies in creating misfortune without 
empathy. 
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